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ABSTRACT 
 
 Trade and environment are equally important and mutually dependant as human 
society cannot stand without an efficient economy and a sustainable environment. It is 
vital to ensure that both regimes evolve towards the better condition without degrading 
each other. The problems occur when there is no clear parameter of the integration of 
environmental protection measures into international trading regime causing the 
unwillingness to cooperate, especially the developing countries which afraid to lose 
competitive advantages to promote national economic growth through international trade 
and investment. On the other hand, the unilateral efforts of the developed countries to 
address environmental problems by using trade-related measures may violate and 
undermine trade’s principles because it may create unfair trade barriers and restrictions. 
Under multilateral trade rules and jurisprudence, the use of trade measures can be 
justified for environmental protection in certain circumstances. However, the further 
cooperation between trade and environmental organizations and developed and 
developing countries is needed in order to develop a win-win solution for the use of 
environmental trade measures and to negotiate for possible integration of other 
environmental protection measures into trade agreements without regressing the trading 
system. 
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บทคดัย่อ 
 
 การคา้และสิง่แวดลอ้มต่างมคีวามส าคญัเท่าเทยีมกนัและต้องพึง่พาอาศยัซึง่กนัและกนั 
เนื่องจากสังคมมนุษย์ปจัจุบันไม่สามารถด ารงอยู่ได้หากปราศจากเศรษฐกิจที่ม ัน่คงและ
สิง่แวดลอ้มทีย่ ัง่ยนื สิง่ทีส่ าคญัทีสุ่ดคอืการพฒันาการคา้และสิง่แวดลอ้มไปสู่สภาวะทีด่ีขึน้โดยที่
ไมท่ าลาย ซึง่กนัและกนั อยา่งไรกต็าม การบรูณาการการคุม้ครองสิง่แวดลอ้มในการคา้ระหว่าง
ประเทศนัน้ยงัไม่มคีวามชดัเจนและแน่นอนดงันัน้ประเทศต่างๆ โดยเฉพาะประเทศที่ก าลงั
พฒันาจงึไม่เตม็ใจที่จะใหค้วามร่วมมอื เพราะกลวัว่าจะสูญเสยีขอ้ไดเ้ปรยีบในการแข่งขนัทาง
การค้าและการลงทุนระหว่างประเทศเพื่อพฒันาเศรษฐกิจภายในประเทศตนในทางกลบักนั
ประเทศที่พัฒนาแล้วได้บังคับใช้มาตรการทางการค้าฝ่ายเดียวเพื่อคุ้มครองสิ่งแวดล้อม              
ซึ่งมาตรการทางการค้านัน้อาจละเมดิข้อสญัญาว่าด้วยการค้าระหว่างประเทศ เพราะอาจ
ก่อให้เกดิการกดีกนัทางการค้าระหว่างประเทศที่ไม่ยุตธิรรม ภายใต้ข้อสญัญาว่าด้วยการค้า
ระหว่างประเทศ ประเทศต่างๆ สามารถใชม้าตราการทางการคา้เพื่อคุม้ครองสิง่แวดลอ้มไดใ้น
กรณีที่เข้าข้อยกเว้นเท่านัน้ อย่างไรก็ตาม องค์กรการค้าและสิ่งแวดล้อมระหว่างประเทศ 
รวมถงึประเทศทีพ่ฒันาแลว้และประเทศทีก่ าลงัพฒันาจ าต้องร่วมมอืกนัเพื่อหาทางออกในการ
ใชม้าตรการทางการคา้เพื่อคุม้ครองสิง่แวดลอ้มทีส่มประสงคแ์ก่ทุกฝ่าย รวมถงึเจรจาเพื่อหาวธิี
ที่จะควบรวมการคุ้มครองสิ่งแวดล้อมให้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของข้อสญัญาว่าด้วยการค้าระหว่าง
ประเทศ โดยไมเ่ป็นการท าใหป้ระสทิธภิาพของระบบการคา้ระหว่างประเทศดอ้ยลง 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
We now live in a globalization world where there are dramatically growth of 
international trade among nations, international circulations of capitals and multinational 
enterprises.1 A global economic development through international trade has been 
significantly increased. International trade agreements and organization, General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO), have 
been established to facilitate international trade circulation and resolve trade-related 
disputes.2 Existing side by side with the up-growing trade regime are the concerns 
towards the environmental protection. Recently, many environmental problems have 
                                         
1Barry C.Field & Martha K.Field, Environmental Economics 20 para1 (5th ed. 2009). 
2Charles S.Pearson, Economics and the Global Environment 288 (2000). 
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been increased domestically and internationally. Environmental protection and economic 
development through trade are equally important and dependent matters, as human 
society cannot stand without an efficient economy and a sustainable environment.  
 The sustainable development, having long-term economic development without 
jeopardizing the environmental condition3, is desirable. However, it is difficult to achieve 
because economic development and environmental protection have been evolved in 
different notions; therefore, in certain circumstances both regimes happened to be in 
conflict in short- terms politics. Free trade competition in international arena for the 
economic development together with the lack of global environmental regulator lead to 
many environmental problems such as a constant increase of pollution emissions and 
low-environmental standards, both in domestic and international areas.  
As there are no international environmental agencies that can impose command-
and-control4 environmental regulation and enforcement over international communities, 
many countries take, either unilaterally or multilaterally, efforts to address environmental 
problems by using market-based tool, trade-related measure.5 Trade-related measures 
are effective because they serve as carrots and sticks, i.e. incentives for complying and 
sanctions for not complying with certain environmental standard.6 Unfortunately, such 
measures are subject to strong debate under multilateral trade agreements due to its 
trade-restrictive characteristics.7  
 To solve those new problems, the relationship between trade and environmental 
regimes need to be clarified and harmonized. Trade regime should not be a rival of 
environmental protection and vice versa. Trade rules should not prohibit the use of 
appropriate trade-related measure to address environmental problems if it is effective 
and necessary. Given the fact that trade organization is very stable and effective in 
                                         
3Frances Harris(ed), Sustainable Development, Global Environmental Issues 267 (2004). 
4Field, supra at 212 para 1. 
5Peter Uimonen & John Whalley, Environmental Issues in the New World Trading 
System  66-67 (1997). 
6Rafael Leal-Arcas, International Trade and Investment Law: Multilateral, 
Regional, Bilateral Governance 27 para 1(2010). 
7Andrea Bianchi(ed), The Impact of International Trade Law on Environmental Law 
and Process, Environment, Human Rights & International Trade 114-121 (2001). 
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setting common rules and resolving trade-related conflicts, though it is not environmental 
organization, it should be an ally to environmental protection. Integrating environmental 
protection into international trade regimes is necessary because trade and environment 
are mutually important and dependent on each other; thus, it is of the essence to 
balance both regimes, focus on definition of win-win strategies, and find the way towards 
the sustainable development.  
 
PART I INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION : CURRENT 
CONCERNS AND CONFLICTS IN REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
VINCINITY 
 
1. ENVIRONMENTAL AND TRADE ISSUES IN GLOBAL SCALE 
 While a rapid growth of international trade have brought many benefits to the people 
and society, there are still critical concerns with regards to the impact of such growth on 
a global environment condition. 
 
 1.1 The inevitable environmental degradation: An example of global warming 
  Undeniably, trade has positive effects on people and society as a whole. 
International trade has stimulated economic growth and generated wealth among 
nations. It also paves the way for an environmental consideration and international 
political cooperation in exchanging advance information and developing technology.  
  Economic growth and wealth of nations generated by international trade are 
believed to be the essential driving forces for a demand on environmental protection. It 
is argued that the relationship between economic growth and environment appears in an 
inverted U-shaped figure called “Environmental Kuznets Curve” (EKC).8 The EKC shows 
that at the early stage of the economic growth, the environment condition is worsen due 
to massive economic activities and pollution; however, at later stage when nations and 
people become rich, the environment condition will become better because people and 
government will have both demand and capacity to clean up the pollution.  
                                         
8Gene M. Grossman  & Alan B. Krueger, Economic Growth and the Environment, 
110 Quaterly Journal of Economics 2, 353-377 (1995). 
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  Nonetheless, the EKC does not demonstrate the complete analysis of 
environmental effect because it fails to take into account of the following factors: 
  (i) The EKC fails to answer the question of irreversible environmental damage 
occurring before the turning point. It argues that the environment would become better 
after the developing countries would be able to invest money in cleaning operations. 
This notion is based on the assumption that the existing environmental damages are 
reversible. However, most environmental harms are considered as irreversible and such 
harms could occur before the turning point; 
(ii) The environmental improvement is not automatic. Once an income per capita 
rises, there will be strong demand towards pollution control regulation. However, such 
demand will need to be implemented through national regulations. For the people’s 
demand to be translated into efficient environmental regulations, the countries need to 
have appropriate authorities in place and an efficient democracy system. Unfortunately, 
this is not always the case.  
     Carbon emissions (CO2) have been steadily increased since the expansion of 
world economy in 1990s. No EKC effect has yet appeared for CO2 emissions. On the 
contrary of environment-income relationship, those emissions gradually increase as 
income increases.9  
 This problem may be a result of an economic growth without economic 
development. Economic growth means an increase scale of economic activities without 
any change in economic structure.10 In contrast, economic development includes 
changes in economic structure, technology and social transformation such as education, 
health care, public transportation and legal institution.11 Thus, economic growths without 
development means while there is massive expansion of economic activities, the nature 
of such activities are the same, i.e. no cleaner technology to help reducing the 
consumption of fuel-based energy and emission of polluting substances. As a result, the 
pollution and resource depletion will grow along the outputs. 
 In sum, it is incorrect to cite EKC as a claim that if countries promote 
economic growth, the environment will eventually take care of itself because the analysis 
                                         
9Field, supra at 406.  
10Id.at 400.  
11Id. 
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of EKC bases on the presumption of perfect market and political mechanism which rarely 
exist in a reality.  
 
 1.2 The integration of environmental protection into international trading 
system: A principle of sustainable development  
 Economic development through international trade and environmental protection 
have long been seen as extreme rivals. Environmentalists see an economic development 
arising from unrestricted international trade and investment as a degradation of 
environment but economists see it as an improvement of environment. Economic 
development and environmental protection have been evolved in different paths but they 
are connected and dependant matters. The key is to find the best compromising strategy 
to develop the “win-win” solutions and tackle the conflicting issues.  
 The political goal of “sustainable development” has been adopted among 172 
nations during the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 
in Rio (Brazil).12  Principle 3 of Rio Declaration reintegrates both needs of environmental 
protection and economic development by stating that the right to development must be 
fulfilled so as to equitably meet development and environmental needs of present and 
future generation.13 
 The basic goal of economic policy is a development on sustainable scale.14 To be 
specific, sustainable scale means that we must consume the energy and natural 
                                         
12United Nations, Section on UN Conference on Environment and Development, 
The Earth Summit 1992,  available at http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html (last 
visited July 5, 2013). 
13United Nations Environment Program, Section on Environment for 
Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992, available at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid= 1163  
(last visited July 5, 2013). 
14Herman E.Daly (eds), Problems with Free Trade : Neoclassical and Steady-
State Perspectives, Trade and the Environment : Law, Economics and Policy 147-152, 
155-157 (1993). 
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resources within the regenerative capacity and we must not produce waste or pollution 
beyond the absorptive capacity of the ecosystem.15   
 
2. DIFFICULTIES IN APPLYING INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES TO DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES IN REGIONAL SCALE 
 
 2.1  The utopia of market circumstance 
  In order to move towards a sustainable development, it is necessary to 
address an inherent bias of present economic system against environmental protection. 
According to the theory of the “invisible hand” introduced by Adam Smith (The Wealth 
of Nation), individual pursuing wealth maximization will, through the mechanism of the 
market, maximize the common good.16 In other words, when the free market works well, 
it will render the common good for the society by itself without any governmental 
intervention. The simple mechanism of the market is the rule of supply and demand. 
Once the environmental goods such as clean air or water in demand become scarce, 
the price will increase. Then people would try not to pollute the valuable assets more.  
  However, in reality, it is not the case because the market fails to take into 
account the effect of the “Prisoner’s Dilemma”17 as described in “The Tragedy of the 
Commons” by Garrett Hardin. “The Tragedy of the Commons ” is the term used to 
explain the cause of degradation of common environmental goods.18 Most environment 
resources or substances have no market value: They are public goods, free to 
everybody but belong to nobody. Thus, everybody takes advantage of it but nobody 
                                         
15Id. 
16Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature & Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book 
IV Of System of Political Economy § 2 (1904). 
17Steven Kuhn, Prisoner's Dilemma, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-
bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=prisoner-dilemma (last visited 20 July, 2011). 
18Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243-1248 (1968) 
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preserves it because in the absence of regulation, there is nothing to guarantee that 
other people will restrain themselves from exploiting it too.19  
  Therefore, due to the market’s failure to place any limitations or regulations, 
the participants in free market will maximize their wealth by over-exploiting public 
resources and the result will be the degradation of such resources. 
 
 2.2 The competitive advantages and negative externalities 
  The main reason to discharge polluting substances in the environment instead 
of cleaning them is because it is cost-free in the producer’s point of view in short-term 
periods. Without governmental regulations, producers do not have to bear the cost of 
cleaning.20 If the released wastes are beyond the absorptive level, they will reappear in 
the form of pollutions. Because those pollutions are external cost of product, they are 
borne by public instead of producers. In term of economic, they are called “negative 
externalities”.21   
  Making the polluters pay for the full environmental cost of their activities by 
internalizing the negative externalities into the products’ price could be a solution: An 
effective price mechanism showing to consumers the real cost of production and 
showing to producers what consumers’ valuation are.22  
  The “Polluter Pays Principle” (PPP) urges governments to impose regulations 
ensuring that the cost of products or services reflect both basic cost of operation and 
                                         
19For instance, believing in the freedom of the sea, fishing fleets have overfished 
and brought many species of fish to great depletion. Eventually, the fishing industries will 
be economically affected from such depletion. By exploiting natural resources over the 
regenerative capacity, short-term economic growth is maximized but long-term economic 
and environmental condition is degraded. The same problem occurs in the field of 
pollution, i.e. in the absence of regulation, people treat air or water as a pollution sink 
because for short-term benefit, it is cheaper to discharge toxic wastes to the environment 
without wasting money to clean it.  
20Hunter et al , supra at 126-127. 
21Id. 
22David Pearce et al., Blueprint for a Green Economy, 154-157 (1989). 
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environmental cost.23 As a result of internalization of externalities, polluting products will 
be more expensive in the market. The consumers will eventually switch to cleaner 
products forcing the manufacturers to improve the production and cleaning process or 
adopt cleaner advance technology.   
  Nevertheless, PPP is controversial because most developing countries have 
not yet accepted it due to the issue of competitive advantages.24 By focusing on short-
term economic gain, many developing countries export goods that do not internalize the 
environmental externalities into the price of the goods. Such goods are cheaper than 
goods from other countries that have adopted PPP. Therefore, goods without externality 
cost from developing countries gain competitive advantages in the international market.  
 
 2.3 The regulatory chill or stuck-at-the-bottom effect 
  While it is contentious whether the international trade competition actually 
leads to the race-to-the-bottom effect in environmental regulations or pollution haven in 
term of trade composition effect, the actual current problem is a “regulatory chill” or 
“stuck-at-the-bottom effect”. The stuck-to-the-bottom effect is a situation where 
competition in international trade has decelerated any improvement of environmental 
regulations that could lead to higher cost of productions for domestic products.25 The 
unwillingness of the governments to improve environmental regulation due to the fear of 
losing competitiveness affects not only on national scale but also on global scale.  
  The most obvious example is the unwillingness of governments to bind 
themselves under international environmental agreements such as Kyoto Protocol, a 
collective policy response to a climate change problem.26 The greater the potential 
impact on domestic producers and export markets, the more difficult it is to build political 
support for policy change; thus, the only way to encourage the improvement is to 
                                         
23Hunter et al, supra at 516-519. 
24Id. at 516. 
25Gareth Porter, Trade Competition and Pollution Standards: “Race to the Bottom” 
or “Stuck at the Bottom”, 8 The Journal of Environmental Development 133-151 (1999). 
26Lyuba Zarsky, Stuck in the Mud? Nation States, Globalization, and the 
Environment, The Earthscan Reader on International Trade and Sustainable 
Development, 19-44 (2002). 
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generate win-win situation, i.e. improvement of both competitiveness and environmental 
performance.27  
  Furthermore, in many developing countries, the problem is about an ineffective 
enforcement of the environmental regulations rather than the stringency of such 
regulations.28 The inefficiency of the enforcement process includes the lack of clear 
authority to monitor industrial pollution and to prosecute violators and the lack of strong 
punishment.29 The underlying problem of an ineffective enforcement of environmental 
regulation is that the governments have ignored the public demand for more stringent 
pollution control. This ignorance from the governments could be a result from 
undemocratic system or unstable democratic system where those pollution-intensive 
industries have connection with elected representatives or officials.30 
 
 2.4 Disparities among developed and developing countries and political 
groupings: The diversity of political standing, economic status, and environmental 
and commercial regulations 
  The main obstacle for the integration of environmental protection into 
international trade regime is the disparity among international and regional actors. Each 
country has its own interest, ethic and value to protect. They do not share the same 
political position: some are democratic, some are dictators, and some are aristocratic. 
They do not share the same economic status: some are communists, some are 
capitalists, some are economically developed and some are economically developing. 
They do not share the environmental and commercial principles: some have very strong 
                                         
27Id. at 25. 
28Sheoli Pargal & David Wheeler, Informal Regulation of Industrial Pollution in 
Developing Countries : Evidence from Indonesia, 104 Journal of Political Economy 6, 
1315 (1996). 
29Bryan Bachner, Coming Home to Roost : Pollution,Law, and Economics in the 
People’s Republic of China, 5 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 643-650 (1993). 
30Kurt Weyland, Democracy without Equity, Pittsburgh : University of Pittsburgh 
Press 129 (1996). 
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environmental policies and enforcement while some do not consider environment as a 
national priority.  
  For instance, developing countries or political grouping such as ASEAN have 
not integrated any environmental protection measures into their trading system. Since 
integrating environmental protection into the main systems is harder and more costly 
than just making political speech or natural reservation, the developing countries would 
integrate environmental protection such as adopting cleaner technology to produce 
goods only when there are foreign supports. Without foreign donors, initiation has rarely 
been made.  
  The disparities among countries are immense. It is not probable, if not 
impossible, to close the gaps. Thus, it is very challenging to have a consensus or any 
harmonized cooperation concerning the environmental protection through international 
trade.  
 
PART II  EFFECTIVENESS OF WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN 
ADDRESSING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 
 
 As international trade has important effects on environment and environmental 
regulations, it is of the essence to examine the role of World Trade Organization in 
addressing trade – related environmental problems and its implication towards 
environmental protection agreements and regulations. 
 
1. THE ROLE OF WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has been created in 1944 to lay 
down groundwork for economic growth through open markets.31 As a result of trade 
negotiation “Uruguay Round”, World Trade Organization (WTO) has been established on 
January 1, 1995 forming a forum for implementing the multilateral trading system, 
negotiating new trade agreements, and resolving trade disputes.32  
                                         
31Hunter et al, supra at 1256. 
32World Trade Organization, Section on What is WTO ?, available at 
http://www.wto. org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm (last visited July 10, 
2013). 
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1.1 The principle of GATT and WTO 
  The original GATT including specific agreements covering many trade-related 
issues have been incorporated into WTO Agreement.33 The main objective of GATT is to 
reduce trade barriers among members and to remove distortions in international markets 
so as to ensure that goods and services are not discriminated on the basis of their 
national origins.34 The non-discrimination principle is a cornerstone of GATT that can be 
portrayed by two main obligations: the Most Favored Nation (MFN) and the National 
Treatment. 
  Under the Most Favored Nation (MFN) obligation, member states of WTO have 
to treat “like products” importing from other member states of WTO the same way,35 
i.e. member states cannot discriminate against or favor imported products from certain 
member states. If member states decide to give advantage to imported product from 
state A, member states also have to give the same advantage to like products from all 
other member states. Under the National Treatment obligation, member states cannot 
treat imported products from other member states different from domestic like products.36 
In other words, member states cannot impose internal regulations or tax on imported 
products so as to give advantage edge for domestic like products. This principle seeks 
to prevent discrimination between imported and domestically produced like products.  
 
 1.2 The general exception clause Article XX 
  Under GATT/WTO principles, member states are free to impose any trade-
related national regulations as long as they do not contradict to the non-discrimination 
principles described above. However, Article XX of GATT provides general exceptions to 
the non-discrimination principles. The use of trade-related measure that is inconsistent 
with the non-discrimination principles can be justified under the environmental grounds 
provided in Article XX. 
                                         
33Hunter et al, supra at 1257. 
34Id. at 1256. 
35Id. 
36Id. 
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  Under Article XX, there are two exceptions on environmental grounds for trade-
related measure:37 
  (i) Trade-related measures are necessary to protect human, animal, or plant 
life or health;38 
  (ii) Trade-related measures relates to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources, provided that such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption.39 
  Nevertheless, both exceptions are subject to the introductory clause or the 
Chapeau Clause of Article XX requiring that such trade-related measures must not be 
applied in a manner constituting a mean of arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade.40 
  By focusing on the manner of how such trade measure is applied, the 
Chapeau Clause aims to screen out the use of trade-related measures as a protection 
mechanism for the domestic product. Some countries may impose trade-related measure 
such as bans, quotas, or standards on imported products claiming that they are 
necessary for environmental protection. Nevertheless, those measures could be used as 
disguised restriction on international trade to protect domestic production. This could 
happen in the situation where the importing state has stringent environmental policy 
requiring the domestic manufacturers to internalize environmental externalities (using 
clean energy for production or cleaning waste before release it to the environment). 
Therefore, the price of domestic products are higher than the imported products from 
exporting countries which have less stringent environmental policies and do not take into 
account of environmental externalities. 
  To eliminate the competitive advantages of cheap imported products and help 
the domestic products, the importing countries may impose trade measure preventing 
those imported products. Additionally, trade measure could be used in the case where 
                                         
37General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Art XX, 1947, available at 
http://www.wto. org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm (last visited 6 July, 2013) 
38Id. at (b). 
39Id. at (g). 
40Id. 
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the importing countries wants to protect domestic manufacturers, especially small or 
medium manufacturers, who produce high-quality products in conventional ways (home-
made/ hand-made products) from low-quality imported products manufactured by big 
industrialized manufacturers who are able to produce massive amount of products in 
lower price.  
  As it is not an initial objective of GATT, environmental protection serves only part 
of exceptions to the main obligations. Therefore, in light of environmental protection, it is 
crucial to examine how far WTO panels are willing to allow justification under Article XX.  
 
2. THE RULINGS OF WTO ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
 Under general exceptions Article XX of GATT, member states may impose trade-
related measure, even it may create trade barriers and contravene to non-discrimination 
obligation, if such measure is necessary to protect environment or relates to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resource, provided that such measure must be 
applied in a non-arbitrary and justifiable manner and must not be a disguised restriction 
on international trade. However, the core debate of whether WTO leaves a sufficient 
space for environmental protection through the imposition of national trade-related 
measure depends upon the WTO’s application and interpretation of exceptions under 
Article XX. The GATT/WTO interpretation of Article XX concerning process and 
production methods and extraterritoriality can be examined from cases below. 
 2.1 The legality of process and production methods: examples of US-
Tuna/Dolphin and US-Shrimp/Turtle cases 
  Under Article XX, trade measures that are necessary to protect environment or 
relates to the conservation of exhaustible resources could be justified. What kind of trade 
measure is at issue? What kind of trade measures that can be justified under Article XX 
(b) and (g)? Does it include the trade measure concerning the production or processing 
methods of the product?  
  The production and processing methods (PPMs) are the manner how the 
products are made or how the natural resources are extracted, grown, or harvested.41 
                                         
41Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al, supra at 203.  
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The trade measure concerning PPMs is directed to how the products are produced not 
to the nature of products itself.  
  For example, a law banning the importation of tuna fish is not a PPM but a law 
banning the importation of tuna fish caught by using a drift net is a PPM.42  
  The PPMs trade measure can be in forms of trade ban, control, or quotas on 
imports. There are two kinds of PPMs measure: product-related and non-product-
related:43 
  (i)  The product-related PPMs measures are applied to assure the safety and 
quality of the end products, which could have effect on consumer. It concerns 
substances creating health risk for consumers that leave trace in the products such as 
pesticide residue in the agricultural products or other toxic remains in food;44 
  (ii) The non-product-related PPMs measures are not related to the end 
product. They are applied to assure the achievement of environmental objective such as 
a ban on whale meat taking in violation of the whaling moratorium.45  
  The use of PPMs is crucial in an environmental perspective but at the same 
time it is controversial in economic perspective. In an environmental perspective, the 
producing and disposal method of the products are of the essence because the 
environmental damage, pollution, will usually occur during such process not from the 
product itself.46 Many environmental externalities occurring from the production method 
in one country can affect not only national but also global environmental concerns such 
as an emission of CFC particles effecting ozone layers. PPMs measure ensures that the 
market takes into account of environmental externalities so that the consumers can 
distinguish goods that are produced using clean and sustainable methods from goods 
that are produced using dirty or unsustainable methods. 
                                         
42Steve Charnovitz (eds), Solving the Production and Processing Methods (PPMs) 
Puzzle, The Earthscan Reader on International Trade and Sustainable Development 230 
(2002).  
43Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al, supra at 204.  
44Id. 
45Id. 
46UNEP-IISD, Environment and Trade : A Handbook 53-57 (2nd ed. 2005).  
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  Despite the benefits of PPMs in addressing environmental concerns, PPMs can 
create a negative economic effect on the exporting countries because PPMs can create 
financial and technological burdens on small producers, particularly developing countries 
because they have to adapt their PPMs according to the requirement of importing 
countries. Moreover, by denying the entrance of imported products, PPMs measure can 
be used as a protection mechanism for domestic products.   
  As to the legality of PPMs measure under WTO jurisprudence, the debate 
concerns the non-product-related PPMs. Previously it was perceived that GATT/WTO 
rules prohibit non-product-related PPMs measure. This perception arose from the 
GATT’s decision on US-Tuna/Dolphin case in the early 1990s. In US-Tuna/Dolphin, a 
case where United States banned the importation of tuna fish caught by using 
techniques which results in an incidental kill of marine mammals in excess of U.S. 
practice, the panel concluded that U.S. importation ban on tuna concerned the process 
of tuna harvesting rather than tuna as a product and could not be qualified for 
justification under Article XX because of its extraterritorial application.47 This decision 
directed on the extraterritorial issue and did not rule that non-product-related PPMs 
measure cannot be justified under Article XX.  
  Now, due to the WTO panel’s decision of US-Shrimp/Turtle case, it becomes 
apparent that non-product-related PPMs measure could be justified under Article XX if it 
is applied in a non-arbitrary and justifiable manner according to the chapeau clause.  
  In US-Shrimp/Turtle case, U.S. law prohibited the importation of shrimp 
harvested in a way that might harm sea turtles unless the exporting countries were 
certified by U.S. administration as having regulatory program to prevent incidental 
mortality of turtle comparable to that of the U.S. (Turtle Excluder Devices or TEDs) or it 
was certified as having a fishing environment that did not pose threat to sea turtles.48  
The Appellate Body held that the trade ban could be possibly justified under Article XX 
(g) but the measure had been taken in an arbitrary and unjustified manner which was 
                                         
47United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, panel report (DS21/R) circulated 
3 September 1991 (Not Adopted). 
48United States-Import Prohibition of Shrimp and Shrimp Products (brought by 
India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand), Appellate Body report (WT/DS58/AB/R) 
adopted 6 Novmber 1998.  
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inconsistent with the Chapeau Clause of Article XX because the U.S. failed to take 
efforts in negotiation with the exporting countries or to make administrative determination 
more flexible by taking into account of exporting countries’ circumstances.49 For instance, 
the exporting country may have adopted other protective measure for turtle conservation.  
  However, the Appellate Body in US-Shrimp/Turtle case concluded that the non-
product-related PPMs measure could be justified under GATT Article XX by assuming 
that there was “sufficient nexus” between the natural resource to be protected and the 
country enacting the environmental measure because the sea turtles migrated into U.S. 
water.50 Thus, the question remains unanswered as to whether WTO allows justification 
of the non-product-related PPMs measure intended to protect environment or natural 
resource outside the territory of the member states enacting such measure. This relates 
to an issue of extraterritorial application of trade measure that will be discussed in the 
following section.  
 
 2.2 The extraterritorial jurisdiction: an example of US-Shrimp/Turtle cases 
  Article XX (b) and (g) give the power for member states to regulate trade 
measure on the ground of environment protection; however, they do not explicitly limit 
the member states’ jurisdictional application of such trade measure. Are the trade 
measures employed by member states to address environmental concerns that could 
have possible effects on other countries acceptable under Article XX ?  
It is noteworthy to mention the exercise of state’s jurisdiction under the 
customary international law, even though the concept of state’s jurisdiction under WTO 
jurisprudence may be more limited.51 According to the customary international law, the 
governmental authority can exercise its jurisdiction by applying laws to persons or 
activities, enforcing sanctions, or exercising judicial power.52  
There are five principles for states’ authorities to exercise their jurisdiction: 
                                         
49Id. at para 163. 
50Id. at para 133. 
51Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al, supra at 236. 
52Id. 
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(i) The territory principle allows states to exercise jurisdictions over persons and 
activities within their territories;53  
(ii) The effects principle allows states to exercise jurisdictions over actions that 
have substantial effects within their territories;54  
(iii) The nationality principle allows states to exercise jurisdictions over their 
nationals wherever they are;55  
(iv) The universal principle allows exercise of states’ jurisdiction over universally 
condemned activities such as genocide, slavery or torture;56 and  
(v) The protective principle allows states to exercise jurisdiction to protect vital 
national interests.57  
In line with the customary international law, the state can exercise its jurisdiction 
extraterritorially regarding environmental concerns in certain circumstances. For 
instance, base on the effects principle, a state can prohibit a person from emitting toxic 
substances that have adverse effect on human or animal in its territory.  
On the other hand, under the unadopted report of US-Tuna/Dolphin case, it is 
perceived that GATT/WTO does not allow the state to exercise its jurisdiction when the 
effect of such exercise will be beyond its territory, i.e. the state’s jurisdictional exercise 
has extraterritorial effect.  
In US-Tuna/Dolphin case, U.S. under Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) 
banned the importation of yellowfin tuna caught with purse seine nets that could cause 
incidental death of dolphins, unless the exporting countries proved that they had 
program-regulating dolphin kill rate comparable to that of the U.S. The panel considered 
that the trade measure taken by U.S. constituted a quantitative restriction on imports and 
could not be qualified for environmental exceptions under Article XX (b) or (g) because 
of its extraterritorial application.58  
                                         
53Id. 
54Id. at 237. 
55Id. 
56Id. 
57Id. 
58United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, panel report (DS21/R). 
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In other words, Article XX (b) or (g) do not have extraterritorial application so it 
can be invoked only to protect the environment or natural resources located within the 
state’s territory. The panel further stated that if Article XX (b) or (g) permitted member 
states to take trade measure in order to protect environment outside its jurisdiction, 
each member state could unilaterally determine the conservation policies of other 
member states and those other member states would be forced to comply with such 
unilateral trade measure, otherwise they would lose trading rights guaranteed by 
GATT.59  
The panel was concerned about the equity and impingement of state sovereignty 
because the US-Tuna/Dolphin case involved the issue of non-product-related PPMs 
measure being employed in a way that it could have effect on the exporting country’s 
regulations and practice. By adopting non-product-related PPMs measure, the importing 
state imposes its ethic, value, and culture preference to the other exporting states.  
Despite the panel’s effort to maintain the stability of trading system and the 
state’s sovereignty, the decision of US-Tuna/Dolphin is misguided. The type of measure 
taken by U.S. was not exercised extraterritorially even its effects were beyond territory.60 
Under customary international law, the concept of extraterritoriality refers to a law or 
measure imposing on persons or activities in a foreign country. In this case U.S. did not 
impose or enforce measure outside its territory. 61 U.S. did not forbid the use of purse 
seine net in catching tuna in other countries but did not allow the importation of the 
products from such harvest into U.S. By holding that U.S. exercised extraterritorial 
jurisdiction because of its effect rather than the exercise of jurisdiction itself, the panel 
went beyond the customary international law and invented more restrictive definition of 
extraterritoriality.  
                                         
59Id. at paras 5.27 and 5.32. 
60Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al, supra at 241.  
61Steve Charnovitz, The Environment vs. Trade Rules : Defogging the Debate,  23 
Envtl. L. 495-496 (1993).  
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Moreover, the panel’s assertion that Article XX does not cover trade measure 
having extraterritorial effect is ruled out by the decision of Appellate Body in US-
Shrimp/Turtle case.62  
The Appellate Body found that:  
“The conditioning access to a Member’s domestic market on whether 
exporting Members comply with, or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed 
by the importing Member may, to some degree, be a common aspect of measures 
falling within the scope of one of the exceptions (a)-(j) of Article XX.”63  
Thus, the presumption that importing state’s measure requiring exporting states 
to comply with or adopt certain policies renders a measure incapable of justification 
under Article XX is an error in legal interpretation. 64  
 Nonetheless, in US-Shrimp/Turtle case, the Appellate Body hold that trade 
measure such as PPMs requiring exporting states to comply or adopt certain policies 
could be justified under Article XX upon the finding that there was “sufficient nexus”, i.e. 
protected migratory turtle species at issue migrated through U.S. water. 65 
This reasoning could work with the US-Tuna/Dolphin case as well because 
“Mexican” dolphins might travel in and out U.S. water: 
(i) What will be the holding if there is no territorial connecting factor? 
(ii) If the environment or natural resources to be protected by importing state’s 
measure are located completely outside the jurisdiction of importing state, either in the 
sovereign territory of other states or area beyond any state’s jurisdiction, can the same 
reasoning be applied? 
 To shed some light on the above issue, it is worth mentioning the obligation of 
states not to cause environmental harm, a part of customary international law.  
This obligation has been elaborated in Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration stating that: 
                                         
62United States-Import Prohibition of Shrimp and Shrimp Products ,WT/DS58/ 
AB/R, 1998. 
63Id. at 121. 
64Id. 
65Id. at  para 133. 
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“State have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
the principle of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental policies and the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.”66 
Since many environmental damages today are occurring globally, such as global 
warming or ozone depletion, the cutting down of trees in tropical forest in Thailand or the 
emission of pollution in China could cause damage across the globe. Thus, one could 
argue that there is “sufficient nexus” for justification under Article XX when European 
Union exercises measure requiring exporting countries to comply with its environmental 
standard in producing goods. This possible interpretation lies within the WTO’s discretion 
and attempt to move towards the integration of environmental protection.  
 
PART III HARMONIZATION OF TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
 
Although trade and environment systems have been developed in separate 
orders, their goals are not inconsistent. The two systems are equally important and 
should be reconciled to settle the existing problems and to prevent future conflicts that 
could occur from inevitable negative consequences of economic activities and the use of 
environmental protection measures. The harmonization could be implemented through 
the adoption of agreed minimum regulatory standard and the exercise of market-based 
tool (as eco-labeling). 
 
1. PROMOTING THE ADOPTION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 
In the international regime, both free trade without any apparent or disguised 
restrictions and environmental protection for sustainable development are desirable. The 
unregulated international market and the disparity of national environmental policy lead 
                                         
66Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, United 
Nations Environmental Programme, available at http://www.unep.org/ Documents.  
Multilingual/ Default.asp? documentid=97&articleid=1503 (last visited July 15, 2011).  
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to both unfair trade due to competitive advantages and degradation of global 
environment. Thus, the market needs to be regulated and the environmental policies 
need certain degree of harmonization.  
 
1.1 The upward harmonization of environmental standard 
The ideal solution is to have an international “upward harmonization”67 or a 
“reflexive harmonization”68 of environmental standard concerning pollution control, 
production and disposal process or energy efficiency.  
The idea is not to have a unification of the standard but to have similar or less-
inconsistent environmental standard; thus, it will still be flexible and leave enough room 
for regulatory experiments in search for the more effective and suitable environmental 
regulation in higher level for certain regions according to local needs.69  
The reflexive harmonization of environmental standard such as setting minimum 
standard does not eliminate the possibility of environmental regulatory competition. 
However, it does prevent the downward environmental regulatory competition, race-to-
the-bottom effect in environmental standard. Instead, it supports environmental 
regulatory competition above such minimum bar, race-to-the-top effect in environmental 
standard.  
Setting green countervailing duties,70 one of upward harmonization measures, 
would equalize the competitive advantages the low-environmental-standard countries 
gain from not adding environmental cost into the products; thus, if there is no more 
competitive advantage, there is no incentive for the countries to lower their 
environmental regulation.  
However, the idea of setting minimum environmental standard has not been 
successfully accepted, especially due to the question of trade protectionism. Developing 
                                         
67Porter, supra at 133. 
68Barnard, supra at 642. 
69Id. 
70Thomas K.Plofchan, Jr., Recognizing and Countervailing Environmental 
Subsidies, 26 Int’l L., 780 (1992). 
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countries strongly oppose the idea because they consider it as a protectionist measure 
to take away their competitive advantage in the market.71  
Implementing the upward harmonization measure is extremely difficult. Even if 
the developing countries agree on the plan, the next question is who get to decide the 
environmental standard. If the standard has been set too high and put too much burdens 
for the developing countries, then it is necessary to establish the entity to give support 
as regards to the transferring of clean and advance technology for production and waste 
disposal. 
 
1.2  The South-South agreement on common minimum environmental 
standard  
As it is apparent that the race-to-the-bottom effect in environmental 
standard does not normally occur in developed world due to its strong political system, 
the problem concentrates in the developing countries that refuse to agree upon the 
international upward harmonization due to the fear of losing competitiveness and foreign 
investments.  
Thus, another alternative is to have a common minimum environmental 
standard among developing countries so that they would be able to negotiate and agree 
on the standard that they consider being suitable and meets both their economic and 
environmental demands.72 It is believed that if there were “South-South” minimum 
environmental standard agreement, those developing countries would not lower their 
environmental regulations or standard to attract capitals from foreign investment or to 
gain competitiveness in the international market from cheaper exports or toxic-intensive 
goods.  
Unfortunately, it may not be the case because, as previously discussed, 
the real problem developing countries are facing is not the race-to-the-bottom effect in 
environmental regulation but the stuck-at-the-bottom effect. Even if the “South-South” 
minimum environmental standard has been reached, there is nothing to guarantee that it 
would be effective because the practical obstacle is insufficient and inefficient 
                                         
71See more in Gareth Porter, Pollution Standards and Trade : The “Environmental 
Assimilative Capacity”Argument, 4 Geo. Public Pol’y Rev. 49-74 (1998). 
72Porter, supra at 143. 
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enforcement of such standard. To implement effective environmental standard, the 
monitoring and enforcing tools together with the great opportunity for public participation 
must be put in place.73 
Therefore, in negotiating the common minimum standard agreement, it is 
necessary to include the provision regarding monitoring and enforcing mechanism, which 
would be another challenge. The monitoring mechanism should collect data for any 
polluted activities and such data should be available to share among the parties to the 
agreement.74 
 
2.  STRENGTHENING ECO-LABELING  
  In the absence of international environmental standard, every country remains 
free to produce domestic and exported products in any manners as they prefer 
according to their comparative and competitive advantages in the international trade 
arena regardless of the environmental consequences. It is highly contentious to push 
forward the internalization of environmental externalities by international agreements due 
to the question of equity and economic advantage. Thus, imposing appropriate eco-
labeling, a labeling system that aims to provide environmental information regarding the 
products and the production and disposal process to the consumer75, would seem to be 
best compromise and could fill the gap of trade and environmental dilemma choice. 
  
  2.1  The power of consumers’ choices 
As it is very difficult to coerce countries to strengthen their environmental 
regulations due to many limitations, eco-labeling is a less trade intrusive method 
because it is a market-based environmental tool serving as an indirect incentive for the 
countries to reconsider their environmental regulation. The best-case scenario would be 
that eco-labeling is a requirement under multilateral international agreement, especially 
trade agreement.  
                                         
73Id. at 145. 
74Id. 
75Shahin, supra at 220. 
A s s u m p t i o n  U n i v e r s i t y  L a w  J o u r n a l  
ปี ที่  4  ฉ บั บ ที่  2  ก ร ก ฎ า ค ม  –  ธั น ว า ค ม  2 5 5 6  | 97 
Kittinut Supsoontornkul  Article 
However, in the case where there is no such agreement and as long as 
trade rules do not constraint appropriate eco-labeling, the importing countries may 
require imported products to put eco-label on products showing its environmental effect 
regarding production and disposal process.  
Although the eco-labeling does not solve the problem concerning 
competitive advantage of the products that do not internalize negative environmental 
externalities into the final prices, it does leave the final decision into the hands of 
consumers. If most consumers prefer to buy the more environmental friendly products 
according to the eco-label such as carbon-emission-free or energy-saving products, it will 
increase the demand of importation of such products and the demand for non-
environmental friendly such as heavy-carbon-emission or non-energy-saving products 
will be decreased accordingly. Consequently, by the pressure of competitiveness, the 
manufacturers would want to enhance and improve their environmental standard for 
product and production and disposal process. 
Moreover, even in the case where eco-labeling is not mandatory, there is 
a strong tendency in an increase of voluntary eco-labeling system by private actor or 
non-governmental organization76 such as International Organization of Standardization 
(ISO) that has developed series of environmental standards (ISO 14020).77 These non-
governmental standards together with the pressure of competitiveness in the market due 
to common labeling practice of competitor may eventually influence manufacturers, who 
initially do not want to label his products. Undeniably, consumes are likely to purchase 
products that have been labeled by credible organization than those which are not.  
 
2.2  The complexities and limits of eco-labeling 
Despite the less-trade-intrusive appearance of eco-labeling measure, the 
increasing complexity and diversity of eco-labeling schemes may create more problems 
for SMEs and exporting countries, especially developing countries due to more burdens 
such as adjusting cost.78 Complex and diverse eco-labeling requirement may put 
developing countries on the disadvantage edge in the international market and may 
                                         
76Trade and Environment at the WTO, supra at 16 para 2. 
77Charnovitz,  supra at 15 para 2. 
78Trade and Environment at WTO, supra at  16 para 2. 
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mislead the consumers’ choices. The large number of different eco-labeling schemes 
may create confusion for consumers because they may not be able to recognize and 
trust the information shown on the labels. 79 
To avoid the problem, every country should be able to participate in 
discussion regarding setting clear and appropriate eco-labeling standards. This will also 
eliminate those eco-labeling requirements that are discriminatory and disguised trade 
distortions. The eco-labeling standard may have to consider balancing between the local 
environmental concerns and global environmental concerns.80  
 
CONCLUSION 
Together with the economic prosperity, technology innovation, international 
political stability, international trade has also brought about many environmental 
concerns, both in national and global scale. Economic growth without development or 
change in the nature of activities can lead to both domestic and international 
environmental degradation because the pollution is increased as the scale of economic 
activities is increased. Environmental degradation has occurred as result of the failure of 
unregulated market leading to the tragedy of the commons as well as the stuck-at-the-
bottom effect of environmental regulations. The perfect circumstance is to have a 
sustainable development where trade and environment can, at least, coexist without 
degrading each other, or in the best-case scenario, place themselves in a new and 
innovative green economy. 
  Many countries have taken both unilaterally and multilaterally efforts to address 
the environmental problems by using trade-related measures. Inevitably, the use of 
environmental trade-related measures is likely to be in conflict with non-discriminatory 
trade rules and subject to strong scrutiny of GATT/WTO panels. Since GATT/WTO is not 
an environmental organization, the use of trade-related measure to address environment 
concerns serve only derogations to the main obligation of facilitating trade flow. The 
environmental exceptions provided in Article XX of GATT are broad and sufficient to 
allow the use of certain trade measures to tackle with environmental problems. 
                                         
79Id. at 17 para 1. 
80Id. at 17. 
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Moreover, GATT/WTO has recently developed more amicable jurisprudence towards the 
use of environmental trade measure.  
Though GATT/WTO jurisprudence opens door for the possibility of the use of 
environmental trade measure to address the environmental concerns, the parameters of 
such usage are still unclear and need further interpretation and clarification. Instead of 
relying solely upon the guidance of GATT/WTO panels on case-by-case basis, other 
possible alternatives are available for the harmonization of trade and environmental 
regimes. Establishing environmental minimum standard regarding trading products or 
process, international or regional, could help reducing the stuck-at-the-bottom problem 
as well as removing the comparative and competitive advantages of pollution-intensive 
products or the products produced in environmental low-standard countries. Furthermore, 
using market-based and less intrusive method such as imposing eco-labeling to send the 
right environmental information to consumers is a bargaining alternative because it does 
not, at least not as much as other methods, compromise trade flow.  
 Conclusively, protecting the environment is a new challenge for international 
trade. It should be seen as a chance to develop stronger links between nations and 
political grouping such as ASEAN and to promote international trade: protection of the 
environment is neither an obstacle to development or trade unless it is intentionally used 
for this purpose. Trade and environment are both about long-term politics to promote 
developments and peace.  
In contrast, short-term environmental and trading policies can only lead low-
standard nations to fail on their way to development. A cleaner economy, respectful of 
the environment, could help international trade if it is use to promote safer goods and 
better producing conditions. The importance is that the environment protection for the 
present and future generations must not be used in a way to re-install old protectionist 
policies that international community has tried to eliminate since the end of World War II. 
 
